RN Ankersmit Narrative Logic 1983 ChpI

{$authorLName} is interested in establishing the logical foundations that form the analytical basis of historical narratives (p.6). In order to do so, he distinguishes them from the simple presentations of historical facts, such as a collections of quotations in the spirit of Q on the one hand, and from the historical novel on the other. The "more" of such a narrative is the narrative framework, which {$authorLName} defines at a later point.1

{$authorLName} (p.8) unobjectionably proposes to differentiate between the fact finding of historical research and the Verschriftung or emplotment [word-choice RCK] of writing a historical narrative, i.e. (p.8)

the narrative writing of history

Against, Oakshott, {$authorLName} (p.8) maintains that this distinction between research and writing is valid, even if each of the activities influences the other. In this context, {$authorLName} can speak of (p.8)

a specific frame of narrative interpretation

{$authorLName} (p.9) thinks that recent philosophy of history had over-emphasized the research question and now work needs to be done on the issue of narratio. {$authorLName} (p.10) rejects the criticism of Mandelbaum that narrativist historiography must focus on the intentional actions of the protagonists; rather {$authorLName} suggests that all kinds of historical facts for exploring big concepts such as the Cold War are legitimate subject matters for narrativist historiography. In this context, {$authorLName} expressively permits (p.10)

concepts and theories unknown to the historical agents themselves

In the context of (p.10 fn 6), {$authorLName} points to the notions of unintended consequences, as exposed by Hegel and Mandeville, and considers them to be fatal for the Hermeneutic interpretations and the historiographical idealism of a Collingwood, Dray, Van Wright or Martin.

Next, {$authorLName} (p.11) turns to discuss Goldstein, who had claimed that historiographical super-structure (i.e. narrative) had not really changed much since Thukydides, while historiographical infrastructure (i.e. research methodology) had been the main locus of innovation since the inception of Greek historiography.

Equally, Dray had argued the great historians such as Huizinga or Braudel lacked any form of story or narrative in their master works; but {$authorLName} (p.11) thinks that this is a problem of what features people associate with the term narrative. Especially (p.12) in the historiographical works that are diachronic, the (p.12)

cross-sectioned histories

as {$authorLName} calls them, are prime examples of narrativist historiography. And this is due to the fact that they exhibit nicely the logical problems of such linguistic entities as the Renaissance or the French nation.

In this context, {$authorLName} (p.12) makes it clear that with his notions of narratio and narrative substance, he really means no more than "historical interpretation", or (p.12) > Since such theses, interpretations and 'points of view' always require a narratio for their exposition, I describe my investigation as an investigation of the historical narratio.

{$authorLName} objects (p.12) to any psychologism, of the type of Gallie (p.13) or other narrativists, who worry about the "emotional machinery" used to make the historian-reader communication successful. {$authorLName} (p.13) equallly criticizes Louch's requirement that narratives be very evocative—e.g. through the use of words such as "cunning" or "friendly", which trigger shared emotional experiences in the audience. {$authorLName} believes that such claims express a confusion between the past as such, which no evocation can bring closer, and the historical record thereof.

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